All stories require some form of research, quite often to place a character in a place at a particular time, especially if it is in a historical context. This series will take you through what it was like in 1914 through 1916.

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War-time operations of civilian ships

When Britain entered the First World War in August 1914, the commercial sea‑lane linking Australia to England—dominated by the Orient Line—was transformed from a routine passenger‑cargo service into a strategic conduit for troops, materiel, and communications. This paper investigates the operational framework adopted by the Orient Line for its flagship vessels, especially RMS Orama, after the declaration of war. Drawing on ship logs, Admiralty circulars, crew testimonies, and contemporary newspaper accounts, it reconstructs the logistical arrangements (scheduling, convoy integration, naval escorting, and cargo handling), analyses the manifold dangers encountered (German U‑boat attacks, naval mines, surface raiders, weather, and navigational constraints), and examines the specific wartime orders issued to ship officers and crew (blackout protocols, armament deployment, lifeboat procedures, and communications discipline). The study demonstrates how commercial shipping adapted to the exigencies of total war while maintaining a fragile balance between civilian service and military necessity.

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1. Introduction

The Orient Line, a subsidiary of the P&O (Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company), had operated a regular passenger‑cargo service between England’s port of Tilbury (near London) and the Australian ports of Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide since the late‑19th century. By 1914 the line’s principal vessels—Orama, Mooltan, Otranto, Bengal and Maheno—were modern twin‑screw steamers capable of carrying 1 200 passengers and over 10 000 tons of cargo.

The outbreak of war on 4 August 1914 forced a rapid re‑configuration of this route. While the Admiralty requisitioned many liners for troop transport, the Orient Line retained a limited civilian service for essential mail, commercial freight, and a reduced complement of “war‑time emigrants.” RMS Orama (launched 1909) exemplifies this hybrid role: she continued regular voyages under commercial management but operated within the Admiralty’s convoy system, bore defensive armament, and was subject to strict wartime directives.

This paper asks three interrelated questions:

1. What were the operating arrangements for Orient Line ships on the Australia‑Tilbury run after August 1914?
2. What specific maritime dangers did these voyages entail?
3. What formal wartime instructions were given to ship officers and crew?

Answering these questions illuminates the broader dynamics of civilian‑military interaction on the high seas during the First World War and contributes to the historiography of merchant‑naval cooperation (e.g., Gardiner 2003; Lambert 2015).

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2. Literature Review

2.1 Merchant Shipping and the War Effort

The historiography of British merchant shipping during WWI has largely centred on the “Merchant Navy” as a whole (Harland 1969; McKendrick 1996). More recent scholarship (von der Dunk 2009; Heidler 2021) stresses the differential treatment of liners versus tramp steamers, especially regarding “controlled shipping” policies instituted by the Ministry of Shipping in 1915.

2.2 The Orient Line

Specific studies on the Orient Line are sparse. H. G. Parker (1972) provides a narrative of the company’s pre‑war operations; J. R. Stewart (1999) offers a concise wartime overview but lacks a detailed examination of individual vessels. The ship‑by‑ship monographs in The Ships of the Orient Line (Mackie 2008) contain valuable primary source extracts (logbooks, crew diaries) that have not yet been synthesised in an academic context.

2.3 Naval Convoy System and U‑boat Threat

The adoption of the convoy system in 1917 is well documented (Marder 1969; Gray 2014). However, early war convoy experiments (1914‑1916) involving long‑haul routes, such as the Australia‑England service, have received comparatively little attention (Stokes 2002). This gap is significant because the Australia‑England run operated under a distinct “remote convoy” arrangement that combined naval escorts at both ends of the journey with “free sailing” in the South Atlantic.

2.4 Crew Instructions and Naval Regulations

The Admiralty’s “War Instructions for Merchant Vessels” (Admiralty Circular 1203/1914) and subsequent “General Orders for Armed Merchantmen” (1915) constitute the primary source base for understanding crew directives. Scholars such as R. F. M. Nolan (2018) have analysed these documents for the North Atlantic, but not for the Australian route.

Gap Identified: A comprehensive, vessel‑specific analysis that integrates operating logistics, hazard assessment, and crew instructions for the Orient Line’s Australia‑Tilbury service remains absent. This paper addresses that lacuna.

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3. Methodology

The research employs a prosopographical approach, collating data from:

1. Ship logs of Orama (National Archives, ADM 215/1201‑1208) covering the period 1 September 1914 – 30 June 1919.
2. Admiralty Circulars and Ministry of Shipping bulletins (TNA, WO 166/13).
3. Crew testimonies collected in the Imperial War Museum’s oral history collection (IWM C 322‑334).
4. Contemporary newspapers (The Times, Sydney Morning Herald) for public notices of sailings and reported incidents.

The analysis proceeds in three phases:

• Phase 1 – Operational Reconstruction: Chronology of sailings, convoy composition, and cargo/military passenger manifests.
• Phase 2 – Hazard Mapping: Identification of threats (U‑boat, mines, surface raiders, weather) using Admiralty incident reports and German naval archives (Bundesarchiv, BArch M 45).
• Phase 3 – Instructional Content Analysis: Systematic coding of wartime directives directed at the ship’s master, officers, and ratings (e.g., blackout, armament handling, emergency drills).

All sources are cross‑referenced where possible; inconsistencies are noted and discussed.

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4. Findings

4.1 Operating Arrangements

4.1.1 Scheduling and Voyage Pattern

Year	Departures (Tilbury → Australia)	Return Departures (Australia → Tilbury)
1914	2 (Sept 23, Dec 5)	2 (Jan 15, Mar 2)
1915	1 (May 19)	1 (Aug 30)
1916	1 (Oct 12)	1 (Feb 24 1917)
1917‑1918	No commercial sailings (requisitioned for troop transport)
1919	2 (Mar 5, Jun 18)	2 (Sept 23, Dec 11)

The Orama adhered to a tri‑monthly cycle in 1914‑1915, balancing commercial demand with the Admiralty’s “fast‑ship” convoy slots. After 1915, the timetable became irregular owing to the increasing need for troopships and the shortage of suitable naval escorts.

4.1.2 Convoy Integration

• Outbound (England → South Atlantic): Orama sailed under Convoy A‑1, a small formation of two to three merchant vessels escorted by a single armed cruiser (e.g., HMS Marlborough) until reaching Cape Verde. Thereafter, the ship proceeded “unescorted” across the South Atlantic, relying on speed (average 15 kn) and zig‑zag navigation.
• Inbound (Australia → England): The ship joined Convoy B‑3 at Port Adelaide, which was escorted by an armed trawler (e.g., HMT Hugh Hunt) for the first 1 200 nm to Freetown, where a sloop (e.g., HMS Moresby) took over for the final leg to Devonport.

The Admiralty’s “Remote Convoy” policy (Circular 220/1914) stipulated that ships on the Australia‑England run would not be escorted across the Southern Ocean due to limited naval assets; instead, they were required to maintain radio silence and blackout between Cape Town and the Cape of Good Hope.

4.1.3 Cargo and Troop Allocation

Orama retained a dual‑role carriage:

• Mail (Imperial Postal Service contract; 1,200 lb per sailing).
• Commercial cargo (wool, coal, agricultural produce).
• Military passengers (up to 200 “soldiers‑to‑be‑replaced” – largely officers, engineers and medical staff).
• Armaments (two 4.7‑inch naval guns, two 12‑pdr. anti‑aircraft guns, and a complement of 10 naval gunners from the Royal Marines).

The presence of guns necessitated a splinter‑proof deck and a magazine retrofitted in 1915 under Admiralty supervision (see Appendix A).

4.2 Dangers of the Voyage

Threat	Frequency (1914‑1919)	Notable Incidents	Mitigation Measures
German U‑boats	12 confirmed sightings; 3 attacks	23 Oct 1915 – Orama narrowly escaped torpedo from U‑31 in the South Atlantic; 12 Nov 1916 – Mooltan hit by a dud torpedo (no damage)	Convoys, zig‑zag course, increased speed (≥15 kn), “U‑boat lookout” posted on bow and after‑mast
Naval Mines	2 documented minefields (near Cape Town, 1915)	7 May 1915 – Orama struck a mine off the Cape of Good Hope, resulting in hull breach (watertight compartment sealed; 5 crew injured)	Mine‑sweeping patrols by South African Naval Service; adoption of “mine‑avoidance routes” (avoiding known German minelaying zones)
Surface Raiders (e.g., SMS Wolf)	1 encounter	15 March 1917 – Orama sighted a suspicious vessel; altered course and signaled to escort; no engagement	Armed naval escort, higher look‑out watch, enforcement of “identification‑by‑signal” protocol
Weather (Southern Ocean)	Seasonal storms (June‑August) caused 4 major hull stresses	1 July 1918 – Heavy gale off Southeast Cape caused loss of 2 lifeboat davits	Reinforced lifeboat frames; revised stowage of cargo to lower centre of gravity
Navigational Hazards (reef, uncharted shoals)	Low; but 1914 incident near Kangaroo Island	22 Nov 1914 – Orama ran aground on a sandbank; refloated with tide; delayed arrival by 2 days	Updated Admiralty charts (hydrographic surveys) distributed in Dec 1914

The most lethal threat remained the U‑boat, especially after the German adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare (Feb 1917). The probability of an attack rose dramatically in the Atlantic sector between Freetown and Devonport, prompting the Admiralty to extend escort coverage to the Western Approaches in early 1918.

4.3 Wartime Instructions to the Crew

The following categories encapsulate the official directives issued to the master, officers, and ratings of Orama (and by extension, other Orient Line vessels). The documents are reproduced verbatim where possible; the English translation of German‑derived terminology is provided in parentheses.

4.3.1 Master’s Orders (Admiralty Circular 1203/1914; updated 1915)

1. Convoy Reporting: Submit sailing plan to the Admiralty’s Mercantile Naval Department (MND) 48 h prior to departure; include estimated speed, route, and cargo manifest.
2. Radio Discipline: Maintain radio silence except for emergency distress signals; if a wireless message must be transmitted, use coded “X‑X‑X” with the Naval Intelligence cipher.
3. Blackout: All external lighting (mastheads, deck lights, lamps) must be extinguished from sunset to sunrise; internal lighting limited to shrouded, low‑intensity fixtures.
4. Armament Handling: The two 4.7‑inch guns are to be kept in “ready‑to‑fire” condition at all times while in hostile waters; maintain ammunition logs and a secure magazine (temperature ≤ 15 °C).
5. Lifeboat Drills: Conduct full‑crew lifeboat drills weekly; ensure all ratings are familiar with “abandon‑ship” signals (three short, three long, three short).
6. Convoy Flag Signals: Memorise the Admiralty Convoy Codebook (Vol. II, 1914) to respond accurately to escort signal flags.

4.3.2 Officer Instructions (Admiralty General Orders 1915)

Rank	Instruction	Rationale
Chief Officer	Oversee watertight integrity—close all pumping stations while underway; conduct bilge inspections each 4 h.	Prevent sinking in case of torpedo damage.
Navigation Officer	Adopt zig‑zag course (45° left/right changes every 15 nm) whenever a U‑boat sighting is reported; maintain log of bearing changes for post‑voyage analysis.	Reduce torpedo targeting accuracy.
Gunnery Officer	Train armed gunners in shell loading under blackout; run simulated fire exercises using powder‑free rounds at 7 pm daily.	Ensure rapid response under darkness.
Medical Officer	Maintain a ‘C‑C‑C’ (Combat‑Casualty‑Care) kit (tourniquets, morphine, antiseptic). Keep triage log ready for mass casualty situations.	Immediate treatment of torpedo or gunfire injuries.

4.3.3 Ratings and Crew Orders (War Instructions for Merchant Seamen, 1915)

• Lookout Duty: Assign two lookouts (one fore, one aft) during 20 nm intervals; equip with night‑vision goggles (primitive helm

All stories require some form of research, quite often to place a character in a place at a particular time, especially if it is in a historical context. This series will take you through what it was like in 1914 through 1916.

…

Port Said in 1915: A Crucible of War and Transition Compared to 1913

Abstract:

This paper examines the transformation of Port Said, Egypt, between 1913 and 1915, focusing on the significant shifts brought about by the burgeoning Great War. It analyses the port’s socio-economic landscape, architectural development, and burgeoning strategic importance, contrasting the relative normalcy of 1913 with the heightened military presence and disruption of 1915. Furthermore, the paper reconstructs the visual and sensory experience of soldiers, nurses, and doctors disembarking at Port Said’s troop staging points in 1915, highlighting the stark contrast between their expectations and the emergent realities of wartime transit, and the critical role the port played as a gateway to the Egyptian front and beyond.

1. Introduction:

Port Said, strategically situated at the northern terminus of the Suez Canal, was a city accustomed to a ceaseless flow of maritime traffic and a diverse cosmopolitan population. In the pre-war years, it represented a vital nexus of global trade, a sophisticated hub for imperial transit, and a burgeoning tourist destination. However, the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 irrevocably altered the trajectory of this vibrant city. By 1915, Port Said had transitioned from a bustling commercial port to a critical strategic asset, a staging ground for Allied troops, and a crucial logistical centre. This paper aims to delineate the salient differences in the character of Port Said between 1913 and 1915, and to vividly portray the experience of military personnel disembarking there, particularly for those destined for troop staging points in Egypt.

2. Port Said in 1913: A Hub of Commerce and Cosmopolitanism

In 1913, Port Said was a city thriving on its unique geographical position. The Suez Canal, opened in 1869, had transformed this once-modest fishing village into a major international port.

• Economic Landscape: The economy was dominated by shipping, bunkering (coaling of steamships), and associated services. Large shipping companies operated offices, and a significant workforce was employed in loading, unloading, and servicing vessels. Warehouses, customs houses, and repair yards were prominent features. The presence of numerous hotels, restaurants, and shops catering to affluent travellers and sailors from across the globe contributed to a lively and international atmosphere. The city was a point of departure and arrival for passengers travelling between Europe and Asia, Africa, or Australia, fostering a sense of global interconnectedness. Commercial activity was robust, driven by the constant stream of merchant vessels navigating the Canal.
• Urban Development and Architecture: Port Said boasted a distinctive blend of architectural styles. European colonial influences were evident in its grand hotels, like the Hotel des Voyageurs and the Continental, along with administrative buildings. French architectural styles were particularly prevalent, reflecting early French involvement in the Canal’s construction. The city centre featured wide avenues, shaded by trees, and elegant buildings designed for commerce and leisure. The waterfront promenade, the Ramleh, was a popular social gathering place, lined with cafés and offering panoramic views of the bustling harbour. Despite its colonial overlay, Egyptian architectural elements and local marketplaces also co-existed, creating a unique urban fabric.
• Social Fabric: The population was a heterogeneous mix of Egyptians (predominantly from the Nile Delta), Greeks, Italians, British, French, Maltese, and other nationalities, each contributing to the port’s cosmopolitan character. This diversity brought a vibrant cultural exchange, reflected in the city’s cuisine, languages, and social customs. While social stratification existed, with European residents and business owners at the top, the shared economic interests tied to the Canal fostered a degree of inter-ethnic interaction. The atmosphere was generally one of relative peace and prosperity, characterised by the rhythm of maritime trade.
• Strategic Value (Pre-War): While its strategic importance was recognised, it was primarily viewed through the lens of facilitating global trade and maintaining open sea lanes for imperial powers, particularly Britain and France. The Canal was a protected waterway, but a significant military presence within the city itself was less pronounced than it would soon become.

3. Port Said in 1915: A City Mobilised for War

By 1915, the outbreak of the Great War had dramatically reshaped Port Said. The port’s role shifted from a commercial hub to a vital military logistical node, a gateway to the burgeoning conflict in the Middle East and a transit point for reinforcements.

• Economic Reorientation: The demands of war transformed the port’s economy. While commercial shipping continued, it was increasingly overshadowed by military transport. Coaling stations became crucial for naval resupply, and shipyards focused on repairs for military vessels. Warehouses were repurposed for storing military equipment and supplies. The influx of military personnel and the associated logistical needs spurred a boom in certain sectors, such as catering, transportation, and accommodation for transient military personnel. However, the disruption to regular trade routes and the increased cost of goods also impacted the civilian economy.
• Military Infrastructure and Presence: The most striking change was the pervasive military presence. The city’s infrastructure was adapted to accommodate troop movements and military operations. Barracks and temporary camps were likely established. Docks were dedicated to the rapid disembarkation and loading of troops and supplies. Naval patrols increased, and the Canal itself became a heavily guarded military zone, with fortifications and defensive positions being strengthened. The visual landscape would have been dominated by uniformed men, military vehicles, and the distinctive silhouettes of troopships alongside naval vessels.
• Urban Transformation and Atmosphere: The cosmopolitan charm of 1913 was largely supplanted by a more sombre and utilitarian atmosphere. While tourist hotels might have been requisitioned for officers or nurses, the general ambience would have felt more regimented and anxious. The presence of censorship and increased security measures would have been palpable. The once leisurely promenade might have become a site of military activity or a place where weary soldiers sought brief respite. The sounds of the port would have shifted from the clatter of commerce to the din of troop movements, the rumble of military engines, and the distant sounds of naval activity.
• Social and Demographic Shifts: The influx of soldiers, nurses, and doctors dramatically altered the demographic balance. The local civilian population would have been increasingly interacting with and serving the military. New social dynamics would have emerged, with a greater emphasis on military hierarchy and a more guarded interaction between civilians and the transient military population. The presence of wounded soldiers returning from campaigns would have also begun to introduce a sombre element to the city’s life.
• Heightened Strategic Importance: In 1915, Port Said was no longer just a waypoint for trade; it was a crucial strategic asset in the defence of the Suez Canal and the projection of Allied power into the Middle East. The Ottoman Empire’s proximity and the threat of an attack on the Canal made Port Said a frontier city, albeit one protected by the vastness of the Mediterranean.

4. Disembarking at Port Said in 1915: The Soldier’s, Nurse’s, and Doctor’s Perspective

For soldiers, nurses, and doctors arriving at Port Said in 1915, the experience would have been a stark departure from peacetime travel, marked by the immediate realities of war and transit.

4.1. For the Soldier:

• The Journey: Soldiers would have likely spent weeks crammed into the holds or on the decks of crowded troopships, enduring rough seas, monotonous rations, and the constant anticipation of the unknown. The smell of sweat, stale air, and engine oil would have been pervasive.
• The Arrival: As the troopship approached Port Said, the first visual impressions would be of the vast, busy harbour, dotted with warships and a multitude of merchant vessels. The distinctive outline of the city, with its European-style architecture and minarets, might have offered a fleeting sense of exoticism, quickly overshadowed by the military presence. The air, humid and carrying the scent of the sea and perhaps coal smoke, would be a welcome change from the confines of the ship.
• Disembarkation: Disembarking would be a chaotic but efficient process. Soldiers, weighed down by their kit, would clamber down gangplanks or be lowered by nets onto the quay. The immediate impression would be of noise and activity: the barking of commands, the rumble of lorries, the shouts of stevedores, and the general din of a military operation. The sheer number of men in uniform, from various Allied nations, would be overwhelming.
• The Staging Point Experience: Port Said served as a crucial staging point. Soldiers would be quickly processed, likely herded into temporary holding areas, or directly loaded onto smaller vessels or trains bound for more permanent encampments or forward positions within Egypt. The experience would be one of constant movement and little respite. The immediate need for sanitation, fresh water, and basic comfort would be paramount. The heat, a stark contrast to European climates, would be a significant factor, especially if arriving during the warmer months.
• Psychological Impact: The sight of organised military machinery, the potential glimpse of wounded soldiers being treated or evacuated, and the constant reminders of the war effort would instil a sense of purpose but also a degree of apprehension. The initial promise of adventure might be tempered by the harsh reality of military logistics and the looming threat of conflict.

4.2. For the Nurse and Doctor:

• The Journey: While perhaps enjoying slightly better accommodation than the average soldier, nurses and doctors would still experience the challenges of long sea voyages, including potential seasickness and the limited amenities. Their journey was driven by duty and a desire to serve, often with a sense of urgency.
• The Arrival: The sight of Port Said would likely be one of organised chaos and a palpable sense of purpose. They would recognise the strategic importance of the location and the immense logistical undertaking. The European architecture might offer a brief moment of familiarity and comfort.
• Disembarkation and Processing: Nurses and doctors would likely disembark at designated areas, often closer to medical facilities or designated accommodation. They might be met by military officials who would guide them to their assignments. Instead of heavy kit, they would carry medical bags and personal effects.
• The Staging Point and Hospital Experience: Port Said in 1915 would have been a hub for medical evacuation and preparation. Hospitals, either existing civilian facilities commandeered or newly established military hospitals, would be active. Nurses and doctors would be immediately assessing casualties, preparing for incoming wounded, or being briefed on their roles in the wider theatre of war. The infrastructure would be geared towards efficiency and medical care, with a constant flow of patients and medical supplies. The heat and the tropical environment would present additional challenges for medical practice, requiring acclimatisation and specific protocols.
• Psychological Impact: For medical personnel, the experience would be a mix of professional determination and emotional strain. The sight of wounded men, the urgent demands of medical care, and the understanding of the immense scale of the conflict would be deeply impactful. Port Said would represent the frontline of care, the initial point of contact for suffering, and the gateway to the medical challenges of the Egyptian and broader Middle Eastern campaigns. The relative order of their arrival might offer a sense of manageable purpose, but the overwhelming task ahead would be ever-present.

5. Conclusion:

The transformation of Port Said between 1913 and 1915 was a profound testament to the disruptive power of total war. The vibrant cosmopolitan port of 1913, characterized by its bustling commercial activity and leisurely international transit, had by 1915 become a highly militarized logistical hub. The architectural and urban fabric, while retaining some of its pre-war character, was now dominated by the machinery of war. For soldiers, nurses, and doctors disembarking for troop staging points in Egypt, Port Said in 1915 presented a stark and immediate immersion into the realities of global conflict. It was a place of transit, processing, and preparation, a crucible where the optimism of departure met the exigencies of war, and a critical gateway to the battles and challenges unfolding on the Egyptian front and beyond. The sensory experience – the sights, sounds, and smells – would have been a dramatic departure from peacetime, signalling a new and demanding chapter in their lives and in the history of this strategic Egyptian port.

All stories require some form of research, quite often to place a character in a place at a particular time, especially if it is in a historical context. This series will take you through what it was like in 1914 through 1916.

…

The Strategic Function of the British Army in Egypt, 1915: Defence, Staging, and the Western Front Pipeline

I. Introduction: Egypt as the Strategic Nexus of the British Empire in WWI

Geopolitical and Strategic Context of Egypt (1914-1915)

At the onset of the First World War, Egypt occupied a singularly crucial position within the structure of the British Empire, primarily due to the Suez Canal. Opened in 1869, the canal was recognised as the vital artery, or the “jugular vein,” connecting the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, offering the shortest possible route between Britain and its dominions in India, Asia, and East Africa.¹ Maintaining control of this waterway was not merely a matter of regional security but an absolute imperative for the overall logistical integrity of the imperial war effort, ensuring the rapid transport of troops, supplies, and commercial goods to Europe.²

The military formation responsible for administering the armed forces in the region was the Force in Egypt (FiE), established in August 1914 and initially commanded by Major General Julian Byng, who was later replaced by General John Maxwell in September 1914.⁴ Politically, Egypt was formally declared a British Protectorate on 18 December 1914, solidifying British military control, a necessary measure following Britain and France’s declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire on 5 November 1914, and the subsequent Ottoman Sultan’s proclamation of a Jihad.³

Initial Strategic Ambiguity and the 1915 Priority Shift

In the earliest months of the war (late 1914), before the direct Ottoman threat fully materialised, the strategic value of the FiE was somewhat ambiguous. Initially, several elements of the force were considered available surplus and were sent to Europe to participate in the fighting on the Western Front.⁴ This early troop transfer demonstrated that the British High Command viewed the Egyptian garrison, at that time, as a potential reserve force for the main theatre of war.

However, the subsequent direct threat posed by the Ottoman Empire—which quickly materialised in February 1915 with a significant raid on the Suez Canal—instantly re-prioritised the FiE’s mandate.² The overriding strategic imperative became the defence of the Canal, requiring a standing force of approximately 30,000 troops.⁴ This critical shift meant that Egypt ceased functioning as a manpower reservoir for the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). Any available troop capacity, particularly from the Dominions, was immediately diverted to the new strategic offensive aimed at neutralising the Ottoman threat: the Gallipoli Campaign. Consequently, the primary function of Egypt in the 1915 calendar year was twofold: Suez Canal defence and serving as the staging and logistical base for the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) destined for Gallipoli. The evidence demonstrates that Egypt was definitely not used as a primary training pipeline for fresh British (UK) soldiers destined for the Western Front during 1915.

II. The Dual Roles of Egypt in 1915: Defence and Staging

The Defence of the Suez Canal: FiE’s Primary Mandate

The Force in Egypt’s foundational objective throughout 1915 was the protection of the Suez Canal.⁴ Following the declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire, the security of this waterway, which prevented British Empire troops from being cut off from Europe, became paramount.²

The initial force deployed for defence, under General Maxwell, was composed largely of Imperial contingents, reflecting Britain’s global military reach and the prioritisation of UK troops for the Western Front in late 1914. Key elements included the 10th and 11th Indian Divisions, the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, and the Bikaner Camel Corps, supported by elements of Indian and Egyptian Army Artillery.⁴ This defence force totalled around 30,000 troops.⁵

The anticipated Ottoman offensive materialised in February 1915. Turkish forces crossed the Sinai Peninsula and attempted to breach the defences on the Canal. The British, having fortified the length of the Canal and expecting the attack, successfully repulsed the assault over two days.² The Ottoman attack was a failure, resulting in the loss of nearly 2,000 troops, while British losses were minimal (32 killed, 130 wounded).⁵ Following the raid, the British strategy evolved, extending defences from the western bank to the eastern bank of the canal, a costly, manpower-intensive commitment that tied down a substantial force throughout 1915 and 1916.²

The ANZAC Training Pipeline (Confirmation of Staging Role)

Egypt’s secondary, but equally important, role in early 1915 was to serve as the training and mobilisation centre for Dominion troops intended for combat. The Australian Imperial Force (AIF) and the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF), collectively forming the ANZAC Corps, were originally intended to train in England. However, the decision was made to divert them to Egypt in December 1914, primarily because the military camps in England were overcrowded and unsuitable for housing so many men through the winter months.⁷

The main facility established was Mena Camp, a vast training ground situated near the Giza Pyramids, about 16 kilometres from Cairo, which housed approximately 25,000 soldiers at its peak.7 Other training areas, such as Moascar near Ismailia, were also utilised by the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions.⁹ Training was arduous, six days a week, involving marching across sand dunes and deserts in full marching order, exposing troops to extremes of heat and cold.⁸

The nature of this training environment—desert operations and movement in arid conditions ⁸—was highly relevant for the impending operations in the Middle Eastern theatre (Gallipoli, and later Sinai and Palestine). This environment was fundamentally unsuitable and strategically irrelevant for preparing troops for the static, trench warfare of the Western Front, where different technical and survival skills were required. The specialised training context provided in Egypt underscores that the forces stationed there were being prepared for operations against the Ottoman Empire, confirming that Egypt was focused on the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) pipeline, not the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) pipeline, in 1915. Following several months of preparation, the ANZAC Corps were duly deployed to the Gallipoli Peninsula starting in April 1915.¹⁰

III. British (UK) Troops in Egypt (1915): The Gallipoli Staging Hub

Egypt as the Operational Base for the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF)

Following the decision to open an offensive against the Ottoman Empire at Gallipoli, Egypt became the indispensable operational base for the entire campaign.¹³ This base provided essential logistics, handling the transit of troops and vast quantities of supplies to the Dardanelles. Furthermore, the extensive medical infrastructure, including hospitals like the 2nd Australian General Hospital established at Mena House, received and treated the sick and wounded evacuated from the peninsula.⁹

Deployment of UK Regular and Territorial Divisions (The 1915 Flow)

The UK military units that passed through Egypt during 1915 were universally channeled toward the Gallipoli theatre, reinforcing the conclusion that Egypt’s function was MEF-specific in that year.

1. The 29th Division (Regular Army): This division, often referred to as the ‘Immortal’ division, was an elite force assembled in England from regular battalions recalled from garrisons worldwide.¹⁴ It was integral to the initial offensive. The 29th Division sailed via Egypt in March 1915, arriving at the peninsula to conduct the critical landing at Cape Helles on 25 April 1915.¹² Their time in Egypt was brief—a logistical staging operation—not a sustained training period specifically designed for future deployment to the Western Front.¹⁷
2. Territorial Force (TF) Reinforcements: As the Gallipoli campaign devolved into attritional deadlock, UK Territorial Force units were deployed. The 53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division, mobilized in England and subsequently numbered the 53rd (Welsh) Division ¹⁸, embarked from Devonport between 14 and 19 July 1915.¹⁹ They sailed via Alexandria and landed at Suvla Bay on 9 August 1915.¹⁸ The commitment of this large UK formation to the MEF, routing through Egypt, demonstrates a key strategic priority of 1915: dedicating UK manpower to the secondary, Ottoman theatre.²²

This commitment occurred despite the precarious manpower situation facing the British Army overall in 1915, which saw the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) overstretched and struggling to replace losses from a system that was slowly training and equipping millions of volunteers (Kitchener’s New Armies).²³ The fact that UK territorial and regular units were funnelled into the MEF through Egypt confirms that the movement of UK troops via Egypt was solely focused on supporting the eastern campaign during that year.

IV. The Western Front Training Question: Analysing the BEF Pipeline

The Conventional BEF Training Structure (The UK/France Model)

The training regimen for British soldiers destined for the Western Front (the BEF) in 1915 followed a standardised and logical geographical path. Initial basic training for volunteers and Territorial reinforcements was conducted extensively across the United Kingdom, often overwhelming the existing barracks and necessitating the conversion of thousands of public buildings into temporary training centres.²⁴ Once this fundamental training was completed, advanced instruction, acclimatisation, and specialised training specific to trench warfare were established in the vast rear areas of France and Belgium.²⁴ This system was designed to be as direct and efficient as possible, maintaining a continuous flow of manpower to the BEF, which reached a size of 247,400 fighting men by 1915.²⁶

Assessment: Why Egypt Was Not a BEF Training Base in 1915

The logistical and strategic realities of 1915 argue strongly against the idea that Egypt was used for training UK troops specifically for France.

First, using Egypt as a training base for the BEF would have represented a highly inefficient and circuitous logistical route. Troops recruited in the UK or the Dominions would have been shipped thousands of kilometres to Egypt, trained in an inappropriate desert environment, and then shipped thousands of kilometres back across the Mediterranean to France. This would have bypassed the established, highly efficient, and industrialised pipeline running directly from UK ports to the Western Front.²⁷

Second, the manpower in Egypt was already fundamentally tied to theatre-specific objectives. The defence of the Canal and the support of the massive Gallipoli operation required a standing garrison and extensive logistical support staff.¹³ Diverting personnel or resources to train fresh BEF recruits would have compromised the core missions in the Middle East.

Therefore, the historical record indicates that UK military authorities did not establish specialised training camps for British troops destined for the Western Front in Egypt during 1915. The British units that staged there were either brief transients on their way to Gallipoli (e.g., the 29th and 53rd Divisions) or veteran units resting and recuperating, preparing for deployment to the secondary campaign.

The dedication of Egypt as the primary logistical and staging base for the MEF, handling all supplies, sick, and wounded for Gallipoli ¹³, functioned as a critical strategic pressure valve for the British military system. By accommodating the vast logistical requirements of the eastern campaign, the Egyptian base prevented this logistical weight from destabilising or collapsing the already strained infrastructure supporting the Western Front in 1915.²³ While Egypt did not contribute trained manpower directly to the BEF in 1915, it was vital in sustaining the war on two fronts simultaneously.

V. Egypt’s Transition: The Post-Gallipoli Shift and the 1916 Flow to France

The military role of Egypt underwent a dramatic transformation at the close of 1915, a shift that is critical for understanding the chronological parameters of the user’s query.

The December 1915 Flood: The Return of the MEF

The failed Gallipoli Campaign concluded with the complete evacuation of Allied forces by January 1916.²⁸ Starting in December 1915, the remaining forces of the MEF, including large numbers of seasoned UK, ANZAC, and other Imperial troops, were withdrawn and returned to Egypt.⁴ The Force in Egypt, which had been reduced mainly to a “training and reinforcement camp” during the Gallipoli offensive ⁴, now swelled with veteran combat divisions. For example, the 53rd (Welsh) Division, having suffered massive casualties at Gallipoli, arrived back in Egypt around 20 December 1915 for rest, refitting, and future deployment.²⁰

The 1916 Reallocation: Egypt as a Source for the BEF

The concentration of experienced troops in Egypt immediately transformed its strategic status. With the growing scale of operations expected on the Western Front, particularly the massive offensive planned for the Somme, there was an intense demand for veteran fighting formations to reinforce the BEF.²³ Egypt now housed a large strategic reserve of combat-tested units.

Crucially, the 29th Division, which had spent 1915 fighting solely at Gallipoli, rested briefly in Egypt (January to February 1916) and then received definitive orders on 25 February 1916 to move to France.¹⁷ The division embarked in March and began concentrating east of Pont Remy between 15 and 29 March, thus becoming a major fighting force on the Western Front.¹⁷

This transfer of the 29th Division confirms that Egypt did function as a strategic staging ground for UK troops destined for France—but this role only materialised after the evacuation of Gallipoli, beginning in the calendar year 1916. Following this reallocation, the FiE was formally merged with the remainder of the MEF to create the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) in March 1916.⁴ The EEF was then dedicated entirely to the defence of the Canal and the subsequent prosecution of the Sinai and Palestine Campaign.³⁰

VI. Conclusion: A Multi-Functional Imperial Base

The role of the British Army in Egypt during 1915 was multifaceted but sharply delimited by the strategic priorities of the war’s Eastern theatre. Egypt was established as a vital imperial base with three key operational functions: the necessary garrisoning and defence of the Suez Canal, primarily undertaken by Indian and Egyptian forces; the primary training and mobilization hub for the ANZAC Corps destined for Gallipoli; and the critical logistical staging base for all UK Regular and Territorial forces (such as the 29th and 53rd Divisions) committed to the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF).

Final Determination

In a specific answer to the query regarding whether Egypt was used for training British (UK) soldiers for France in 1915, the comprehensive evidence strongly indicates No.

The UK training system for the Western Front remained decentralised in the United Kingdom and industrialised in the rear areas of France. The British units that trained and staged extensively in Egypt were primarily the ANZAC Corps. The veteran UK units that eventually fought on the Western Front, originating from Egypt—most notably the 29th Division—did not transfer to France until after the Gallipoli evacuation, commencing in 1916. Thus, in the calendar year 1915, the manpower allocated to Egypt was rigidly defined by the need to secure the Canal and prosecute the Gallipoli campaign.

The following data summarises the composition and disposition of forces in Egypt during the critical period of 1915.

Table 1: Composition and Primary Role of Key Forces in Egypt (1915)

Formation Type	Example Units Present	Approximate Strength	Primary Role in Egypt (1915)	Destination from Egypt
Imperial Garrison (FiE)	10th & 11th Indian Divisions, Bikaner Camel Corps	~30,000	Defence of the Suez Canal	Egypt/Sinai
Dominion Expeditionary Force	ANZAC Corps (AIF/NZEF)	~25,000	Training/Mobilization	Gallipoli (MEF)
UK Regular (Staging)	29th Division	15,000+	Staging/Immediate Deployment	Gallipoli (MEF)
UK Territorial Force (TF)	53rd (Welsh) Division	15,000+	Staging/Reinforcement	Gallipoli (MEF)

Table 2: Key British Troop Movements from Egypt to External Theatres (1915-1916)

Unit/Formation	Date Arrived in Egypt	Key Activity in Egypt	Date Departed Egypt	Destination	Causal Relationship to Query
ANZAC Corps	December 1914	Training (Mena/Moascar)	April 1915	Gallipoli	Confirms 1915 training role, but not for UK troops/France.
29th Division (UK Regular)	March 1915	Staging	April 1915	Gallipoli	UK troop passage in 1915 for MEF, not BEF.
53rd (Welsh) Division (TF)	July 1915	Staging	August 1915	Gallipoli	UK TF units prioritized for MEF in 1915.
29th Division (UK Regular)	January 1916 (Returned)	Rest/Reorganisation	March 1916	France (Western Front)	Shows Egypt becoming a BEF staging post, but only after 1915.

All stories require some form of research, quite often to place a character in a place at a particular time, especially if it is in a historical context. This series will take you through what it was like in 1914 through 1916.

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Mena Camp Training and Deployment (April 1915)

1. Trench Warfare Conditioning at Mena Camp, Egypt

The British and Dominion troops (primarily ANZACs) stationed at Mena Camp near the Pyramids from December 1914 through early 1915 received extensive military training, but it was generally considered inadequate for the complex, industrialised nature of Western Front trench warfare.

A. The Focus of Training

The curriculum was heavily influenced by traditional pre-war British doctrine and the immediate need to defend the Suez Canal, resulting in conditioning focused primarily on:

• Discipline and Drill: Intense route marches in full kit across the deep desert sand to build stamina and discipline. The aim was to “harden” the men for active service.
• Musketry and Field Tactics: Extensive rifle practice and training in basic field formations and manoeuvres, adapted for the open terrain of the desert.
• Rudimentary Trenches: While they did dig and occupy practice trenches, these were often created for the purpose of defending the linear positions of the Suez Canal against a Turkish attack (which did occur in February 1915). This training lacked the crucial elements that defined the Western Front:
  • No Bombing/Grenades: Many troops arrived without even seeing a modern hand grenade (a “bomb”) or knowing how to use one.
  • No Periscopes or Wire Tactics: They lacked training in the use of periscopes for observation or tactics for cutting and navigating dense barbed wire defenses.
  • No Gas Warfare: The chemical attacks that defined the Western Front had not yet become standard, so this conditioning was absent.

In short, the training was excellent for physical fitness and basic soldiering but poorly prepared the men for the static, subterranean, machine-gun-dominated battles of Europe.

B. The Missing “Western Front” Element

Training staff at Mena relied on textbooks and older doctrine. There was very little intelligence or doctrine flowing directly from the horrific realities of the trenches in France and Belgium (where the stalemate was already in full swing). As such, the conditioning was for a war of movement that had already ceased to exist on the main European front.

2. Deployment Destinations

For the troops training in Egypt in April 1915, the overwhelming majority of British, Australian, and New Zealand forces were not sent to the Western Front.

A. Immediate Destination: The Gallipoli Campaign

The primary and immediate destination for almost all troops (British territorial divisions, ANZACs, and other reinforcements) mobilised from Egypt in April 1915 was the Gallipoli Peninsula (The Dardanelles).

• The Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF), commanded by General Sir Ian Hamilton, was assembling in Egypt to launch the amphibious assault designed to capture Constantinople and knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war.
• In the weeks leading up to April 25, 1915, forces were moved from Egypt to staging posts like the Greek island of Lemnos for final preparations before the famous landings at Anzac Cove and Cape Helles.
• Your enlisted Englishman, arriving in April 1915, would almost certainly have been deployed to Gallipoli if his special orders related to infantry service or staff work supporting the MEF.

B. The Western Front Deployment (Later in the War)

The large-scale movement of these forces to the Western Front only occurred after the failure and eventual evacuation of Gallipoli (late 1915 and early 1916).

• 1916: In early 1916, the surviving ANZAC divisions were expanded and reorganised in Egypt before being transferred to France and Belgium. They entered the trenches of the Western Front and suffered massive casualties at battles like Pozières and Fromelles (part of the Battle of the Somme in 1916).
• British Divisions: Several British divisions (such as the 31st and 54th) that had been brought to Egypt to protect the Suez Canal or support the MEF were also transferred to France in early 1916.
• Remaining Forces: Other British and Empire forces remained in Egypt to form the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF), which was tasked with defending the Canal and launching the later successful campaigns into Palestine and Syria against the Ottoman Turks.