All stories require some form of research, quite often to place a character in a place at a particular time, especially if it is in a historical context. This series will take you through what it was like in 1914 through 1916.

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The Red Line to the Pyramids: Logistics and Experience of Troop Movement from Port Said to Cairo Camps, Mid-1915

I. Strategic Context: Egypt as the Entrepôt of Empire in Mid-1915

The logistical chain supporting British and Imperial forces in the Middle Eastern Theatre during the First World War hinged entirely on the operational capacity of Egypt. By mid-1915, following the initial influx of Australian and New Zealand forces in late 1914, Egypt had solidified its position as the critical staging ground for Allied operations.¹ General Sir John Maxwell, with headquarters in Cairo, administered martial law across the entire region, encompassing the Suez Canal and the Egyptian Delta.² Meanwhile, the complex command structure included the Levant Base, responsible for administering forces destined for Gallipoli and Mesopotamia, with its headquarters located in Alexandria.²

The Dual Pressures on Infrastructure

Mid-1915 represented a period of immense strain on Egyptian infrastructure due to simultaneous military requirements. Firstly, the Suez Canal remained a major defensive priority. Although the Ottoman raid on the Canal had been repelled in January and February 1915, the threat necessitated maintaining heavy garrisons of British and Indian troops along its entire length, supported by continuous supply lines.³ Secondly, the ongoing, brutal Gallipoli campaign required constant reinforcement, casualty rotation, and supply shipment, all coordinated from Egypt by the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF).¹

The continuous rotation of troops and materials through Egyptian ports meant that the rail and road networks were inherently militarised. The critical logistical determination governing the movement of a newly arrived soldier from Port Said toward Cairo was logistical prioritisation. Because the Ottoman threat had only recently receded from the Canal front, military doctrine dictated that forward-area supply and reinforcement movements—carrying ammunition, food, and urgent personnel to the Canal Zone near Ismailia—always took precedence over troop trains moving personnel back toward the relative safety of the Cairo training camps.⁷ This operational necessity inevitably introduced friction and delays into the transfer schedule for new arrivals.

II. Phase 1: Arrival and Initial Processing at Port Said

Port Said, strategically situated at the northern entrance of the Suez Canal, served as one of the two primary Egyptian ports (the other being Alexandria) utilised by the British war machine. It was a vital gateway for disembarking personnel, horses, guns, and general supplies destined for the various Egyptian camps and for onward movement to the Dardanelles and other theatres ³

The Disembarkation Sequence: Ship-to-Shore Transfer

The scale of military transport far exceeded the existing peacetime commercial capacity of the port infrastructure. Evidence indicates that large troopships frequently dropped anchor offshore, often “about five miles from shore”.⁸ Direct disembarkation was typically not possible for large numbers of troops simultaneously, necessitating a logistical bottleneck: the transfer of men and matériel from the deep-draught transports to the quayside using smaller craft.

This transfer relied heavily on specialised vessels, primarily lighters, which are flat-bottomed barges essential for moving troops and stores between ship and shore.⁹ This included purpose-built craft, such as the specialised “X-lighters” designed initially for the Gallipoli campaign, which were later dispersed throughout the Mediterranean theatre, including Egypt.¹⁰ The reliance on lighters confirms a structural limitation in the port’s ability to handle the enormous volume of massed transports and heavy equipment arriving daily. Disembarking an entire troopship in this manner was a slow, multi-hour process that formed the soldier’s uncomfortable introduction to the theatre, adding significant time to the overall journey (estimated between 4 to 12 hours depending on port congestion and troop readiness).⁹

Marshalling and Initial Control

Upon reaching the quayside, troops were immediately subject to military authority and directed to temporary marshalling areas. An army camp, likely used by the Australian Light Horse, was known to be established on the edge of Port Said town, indicating an immediate holding facility near the railhead.¹¹ The city itself, a thriving commercial hub adjacent to the Canal, was also a bustling environment, surrounded by local traders and “Side Shows” hoping to profit from the soldiers.¹²

The immediate experience for the soldier included stringent military oversight, particularly regarding health. By early 1915, the prevalence of venereal disease (VD) among Imperial troops was alarming commanders, leading to dedicated hospital wards and strict quarantine measures.¹³ Newly arrived soldiers received explicit lectures on hygiene and were warned that specific areas of the city were designated “out of bounds”.¹³ This imposition of social control reflected the immediate institutional concern about maintaining troop fitness amidst the moral and economic environment of Port Said, which, like other major Egyptian cities, featured restricted red-light districts.¹

Once processed, the personnel, perhaps still on foot or utilising local short-haul vehicles, were marched or ferried the short distance to the Egyptian State Railways (ESR) terminus in Port Said, ready for the main leg of the journey toward Cairo.¹⁴

III. Phase 2: The Strained Corridor—Rail Transit to Cairo

The primary mode of transport from the Canal Zone cities to the interior of the Nile Delta was the Egyptian State Railways (ESR). The military relied heavily on this network, with British staff coordinating closely with ESR officials, whose dedication was noted by senior officers.¹⁵

The Critical Rail Route and Operational Constraints

The relevant rail route from Port Said did not run directly to Cairo, but followed a critical logistical corridor: it ran south along the west bank of the Suez Canal, passing through Qantara and linking up at Ismaïlia—a major military hub containing Moascar Camp and Sector II defence headquarters ³—before heading west across the desert plateau to Cairo.² This line was indispensable for supporting the Suez Canal defences and relied on the adjacent Sweet Water Canal for vital steam engine water stops and supply points, underscoring its dual strategic importance.²

The logistical prioritisation in mid-1915 meant that the single railway line linking Cairo to the Canal Zone was perpetually strained. The movement of troops toward the training areas was secondary to the needs of the active front. Freight trains carrying military supplies, equipment, and ammunition for the Canal defence and forward deployment received priority right-of-way.⁷ This condition caused troop trains carrying personnel to be frequently delayed, shunted, or forced to wait for priority clearances, particularly around congested hubs like Ismaïlia, leading to significantly extended transit times compared to civilian schedules. The management and operation of this singular, vital infrastructure artery were thus central to the British colonial war administration, placing military needs, and not passenger comfort, first.

The total rail distance from Port Said to Cairo is approximately 191 kilometres.¹⁷ Given the operational friction, the frequent stops, and the subordination to supply logistics, the troop train journey would have been protracted, analytically estimated to take between 6 to 10 hours from the railhead to Cairo Central Station.

The Human Experience of Wartime Rail Transit

The physical environment of the mid-1915 transit was arguably the most immediate and severe challenge faced by the soldiers. Mid-summer temperatures in Egypt frequently exceeded $40^\circ\mathrm{C}$.¹⁸ Soldiers noted that the days were “invariable bright and warm under the influence of the sun that scorches the skins,” warning that discarding a hat for even a moment risked “being sent to hospital with a raging headache”.¹⁹

Troops traveled long distances in basic carriages, exposed to the unrelenting heat, dust, and dehydration.²⁰ The physical punishment of the journey was severe, often causing troops to arrive in Cairo already exhausted, increasing their vulnerability to various camp diseases.²¹ The strategic assessment of travel conditions often recommended that military columns sleep during the day and travel at night to mitigate the heat, a practice that might have been applied to troop train scheduling depending on the urgency of movement.¹⁸

The journey also provided a stark visual of the militarised landscape, as the train traversed defence sectors along the Canal, guarded by Indian lancers and protected by armoured trains.⁴ This transit solidified the soldier’s understanding that they were operating in a highly protected, yet still threatened, combat zone adjacent to the front line.

Table 1 summarises the key logistical phases and the expected duration of the transfer under mid-1915 wartime conditions.

Table 1: Logistical Phases and Estimated Timeframe (Port Said to Mena Camp)

Phase of Transit	Likely Transport Method	Key Activity/Challenge	Approx. Duration (Mid-1915)
Ship-to-Shore	Lighters/Tugs	Disembarkation of troops/stores, initial processing at quay.	4 to 12 hours 8
Port Said Marshalling	Foot/Local Transport	Administrative checks, waiting for rail slot and clearance.	2 to 6 hours 11
Port Said to Cairo Central	Egyptian State Railway (ESR) Troop Train (191km)	Slower transit; delays due to Canal supply priority and heat.	6 to 10 hours 2
Cairo Central to Mena Camp	Extended Tramway Line	Urban transit and suburban extension to Giza camp.	1 to 2 hours 22
Total Transfer Time	N/A	Excluding major external logistical/scheduling delays	13 to 30+ hours

IV. Phase 3: Cairo Central Station and the Final Mile to Training Camp

The arrival point for the heavy rail journey was Cairo Central Station.²⁴ From here, the soldiers, typically arriving as large unit groups, had to undertake the final stage of the journey to the massive training facilities located on the outskirts of the city.

Primary Destination: Mena Camp

Mena Camp, situated approximately 10 miles (16 kilometers) west of the center of Cairo, near the Giza Pyramids and the Sphinx, was the principal staging and training camp utilized by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) and other Imperial forces in 1915.¹³ The camp was chosen for its vast space, capable of accommodating unlimited troops for maneuvers, with the Pyramids providing a distinctly Egyptian backdrop.²⁵ At its peak, Mena hosted around 25,000 soldiers.¹³

The Logistical Apex: The Tramway Solution

The movement of thousands of men and their light equipment from the Central Railway Station to Mena Camp utilised an ingenious adaptation of civilian infrastructure: the Cairo tramway system. In late 1914 and early 1915, following the rapid decision to reroute troops from England to Egypt due to overcrowded British camps ¹³, British staff in Egypt set contractors to work specifically extending the civilian tramlines directly to the prospective Mena depot.²³

This extension was a demonstration of the improvisational militarisation of civilian infrastructure. The use of an electric tramway, rather than attempting to mobilise sufficient motor transport or relying solely on marching columns, provided a high-volume, cost-effective, and fixed-route system necessary to link the rail terminal directly to the remote desert camp.²³ Historical accounts confirm that troops arriving at Cairo Station were transferred to Mena Camp “by tram”.²² This mass transit solution allowed the military command to maintain rapid deployment capacity from the heart of the city to the training grounds near Giza.

The final leg of the journey offered a sharp cultural contrast. The tram would have traveled through the dense, crowded, cosmopolitan districts of Cairo before suddenly giving way to the vast, dusty expanse of the desert surrounding the pyramids.

Secondary Destinations

While Mena was the primary training camp near Cairo in 1915, other large British military sites were also critical logistical nodes. For instance, the Heliopolis Camp, located in the eastern suburbs, was home to the Royal Flying Corps and included No. 1 Australian General Hospital, which requisitioned the large Heliopolis Palace Hotel.⁶ Heliopolis, too, was served by the city’s extensive electric tram system, confirming the tram network’s overarching role in troop distribution across the greater Cairo area.²⁷

V. The Experience of Arrival: Climate, Discipline, and Social Friction

The soldier arriving at a Cairo camp in mid-1915 entered a volatile environment defined by extremes of climate and social tension.

Environmental Acclimatisation and Health Crisis

Mid-1915 represented the worst possible time for acclimatisation. The combination of intense heat, dry desert dust, and poor sanitation fostered an environment where disease flourished. Soldiers experienced physical exhaustion from the heat, and training was often strenuous—eight hours a day, six days a week, marching in heavy gear across the desert sands.⁶ Personal accounts from the period describe troops suffering from dysentery (“the squirts”) and heat-related illnesses, noting that the combination of heat and flies (present “in millions”) guaranteed “a good crop of disease”.²⁹ Even at Mena, the 300-bed stationary hospital was quickly overwhelmed with venereal patients by early 1915.¹³ Water supply, though addressed by the rapid laying of pipes to the camps, remained a persistent logistical priority across the desert campaigns.²¹

Discipline and the Crisis of the “Wazzer”

For the newly arrived soldier, the cultural experience of Cairo was immediately juxtaposed with strict military control. Cairo was notorious among commanders for being a place where men were “subjected to more terrible temptations” than anywhere else, leading to efforts by organisations like the YMCA to establish recreation huts near major tram stops to distract soldiers from “immoral pursuits”.³¹

This conflict between troop escapism and military attempts at control peaked precisely during the mid-1915 period. The infamous “Battles of the Wazzer”—violent clashes between Australian troops and local residents/business owners in the Wagh el-Birka red-light district—occurred specifically in May and June 1915.¹ This period of civil-military volatility required constant security. Military Police (picquets) patrolled the slums at night, arresting drunken men and those overstaying leave.¹²

The underlying tension was exacerbated by cultural mistrust. Imperial troops, particularly Australians, often viewed local Egyptians (“Gyppos”) as “devious and conniving,” reinforcing an authoritarian separation.¹³ The social friction was compounded by the institutional management of vice, including the army’s setting up of specific brothels under the Medical Corps’ oversight to try and control the VD epidemic.¹³

The convergence of the extreme physical hardship imposed by the mid-summer heat and the lack of traditional military discipline among certain Imperial troops created a volatile psychological environment that exploded into civil unrest. The climate acted as a pressure multiplier, thinning patience and heightening the need for escapism among troops already facing disease and exhaustion, which contributed directly to the violence witnessed in the city during May and June of 1915.

Table 2 outlines the simultaneous environmental and social challenges faced by troops completing the transit in mid-1915.

Table 2: Environmental and Social Impediments to Transit (Mid-1915)

Impediment Category	Specific Challenge	Operational/Experiential Impact
Climate	Extreme Heat ($40^\circ\mathrm{C}$+) and Dust	Physical exhaustion, heat stroke, reliance on night movement, rapid dehydration 2
Health	Widespread Disease (VD, Dysentery)	Dedicated hospital capacity overflow; restricted leave areas; need for strict hygiene briefings 13
Social Friction	“Battles of the Wazzer” (May/June 1915)	Volatile urban environment; strict MP patrols necessary; high risk of confrontation 1
Logistical Priority	Supply Strain on ESR	Delays in troop trains as rail prioritised movements of equipment and supplies to the Suez Canal defence zone 7

VI. Summary and Expert Conclusion

The transit of a soldier from a troopship arriving at Port Said to a British army camp near Cairo, such as Mena Camp, in mid-1915 was a multi-modal logistical operation spanning over 13 to 30 hours, shaped profoundly by wartime necessity and climate.

The initial phase involved the necessary inefficiency of ship-to-shore movement, relying on lighters due to the port’s structural constraints and congestion. The second phase, the rail journey, was defined by the strategic priority placed on securing the Suez Canal, ensuring that troop trains were inherently secondary to supply movements, resulting in a slow, punishing passage across the desert under extreme heat. Finally, the last mile showcased the ingenuity of the British logistical corps, which successfully militarised existing civilian infrastructure by rapidly extending the Cairo tramway system to provide high-volume personnel transport directly from the rail terminus to the vast training grounds outside the city.

The overall effectiveness of the British logistical system—its capacity to rapidly adapt to the unanticipated deployment to Egypt and incorporate the ESR and city tramways—was impressive. However, this efficiency came at a direct cost to the individual soldier. The harsh mid-summer climate, combined with basic accommodations, led to immediate and high rates of disease and exhaustion. Furthermore, the cultural dislocation and the institutional failure to effectively manage troop leisure time contributed directly to heightened social friction, culminating in significant clashes like the “Battles of the Wazzer.” The journey to camp, therefore, served not merely as a transfer, but as a jarring, high-stress initiation into the unique physical and social dynamics of the Egyptian theatre, preparing the soldier for the imminent, brutal reality of combat operations.

All stories require some form of research, quite often to place a character in a place at a particular time, especially if it is in a historical context. This series will take you through what it was like in 1914 through 1916.

…

The order of ranks in the trenches, from the front line to the rear

Yes, the higher an officer’s rank in World War I, the further their typical position was from the front line. While there were exceptions, junior officers were expected to lead from the front in the trenches, while senior generals commanded from headquarters much further back, relying on maps and signals. 

Officer roles by rank and proximity to the front

Rank	Role and Typical Location	Proximity to Front Line
Second Lieutenant and Lieutenant	Commanded a platoon of 30–50 soldiers. They were in the thick of the fighting in the front-line trenches and during assaults (“going over the top”).	Immediate front line: Constantly exposed to danger and often killed or wounded leading their men.
Captain	Commanded a company of 100–200 soldiers. Captains were also stationed in the front-line trenches to direct their companies, but often maintained a command post slightly further back for better communication.	Front line: Directed operations from the front-line trench system, though with a command post in a slightly more sheltered position.
Major	Served as the second-in-command for a battalion or on a higher staff. In attacks, a Major might move forward once a position was established, but was typically not in the first wave.	Supporting position: Generally located in battalion headquarters, behind the front-line trenches but still within range of artillery and enemy fire.
Lieutenant Colonel	Commanded a battalion (500–1,000 soldiers). By 1915, British army regulations advised against a commanding officer advancing with the initial assault wave to avoid command chaos if they were killed.	Behind the front line: Directed the battle from battalion headquarters, using runners and signals to maintain communication.
Brigadier General	Commanded a brigade (3,500–4,000 soldiers). A Brigadier General would have a command post several miles from the front to manage the larger formation and coordinate with other units.	Back area: Located miles behind the front, but often visited the forward trenches to gather firsthand information.
Major General	Commanded a division (16,000 soldiers). They were further removed from the fighting, operating from command centers in châteaux or other large buildings behind the lines.	Rear area: Directed operations from a command center in a rear area, though still vulnerable to long-range artillery.
Lieutenant General and higher (Army and Field Marshal)	Directed corps, armies, and overall strategy. These high-ranking officers were based at General Headquarters (GHQ), which was located far behind the lines.	Far rear: Exercised command from GHQ, relying on reports and communication technology to direct the war effort.

The “château generals” myth

The term “château generals” emerged as a myth that higher-ranking officers lived in comfort, detached from the reality of the front. While general officers were indeed stationed far behind the lines for command and control, many were killed or wounded, showing they were not completely removed from danger. Ultimately, a general’s function is to command and coordinate large numbers of troops, which was not feasible from a front-line trench.