All stories require some form of research, quite often to place a character in a place at a particular time, especially if it is in a historical context. This series will take you through what it was like in 1914 through 1916.

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The camps of the British Army in Egypt during 1915 were sprawling, temporary cities carved out of the desert, defined by immense logistical activity, culture shock, and preparations for the Gallipoli campaign.

Location and Appearance of the Camps

The primary military staging grounds were concentrated around Cairo and the Suez Canal, serving different functions:

1. Mena Camp (Cairo): This was the most famous and largest training facility, accommodating approximately 25,000 soldiers at its peak.¹ It was chosen for its vast space, situated about 16 kilometres (10 miles) from central Cairo, with the Giza Pyramids and the Sphinx forming a striking backdrop.² In the earliest days (late 1914), space and facilities were rudimentary; some troops slept in bivouacs until sufficient tents arrived two weeks after their initial landing.³ The site, divided into large training areas, was quickly filled with the “hum, bustle, the dust, smell, sounds and lights of a busy city”.⁴
2. Moascar and Canal Camps: Other areas included Moascar, near Ismailia and the Suez Canal, which also served as a training area.⁵ For forces tasked with canal defence, like Indian and Territorial troops, their presence was defined by military works along the waterway. Troops were “under canvas” and lived within defensive redoubts constructed of sandbags and barbed wire.⁶ Other facilities, like the Egyptian Army Barracks at The Citadel, Cairo, and Artillery training grounds at Zahariah Camp, Alexandria, were also utilised.⁵

The Daily Expectation: Training and Climate

The soldiers, particularly the ANZAC Corps, which was the main training contingent in early 1915, faced demanding conditions that directly contrasted with the trench environment of the Western Front:

• Rigorous Training: Training was held six days a week.³ It primarily consisted of marching maneuvers across the deserts and sand dunes in full marching order.² This physical exposure was deliberate preparation for operations in the Middle Eastern theatre, like Gallipoli, requiring specific skills for arid conditions.³
• Climate Extremes: The climate was a constant challenge. The Egyptian winter brought bitterly cold nights, followed by blistering hot days.³ The heat could be intense, regularly topping 30°C (90°F) in the summer. Sergeant S. F. Hatton recalled temperaments becoming “very ragged” during a khamsin, a hot blast of wind from the Sahara that could send temperatures soaring over 50°C (120°F) for days. Men commonly suffered from heat stroke and pneumonia during their training.³
• Canal Defence Duties: Troops guarding the Suez Canal were engaged in constant defensive and logistical work. This included patrolling the banks at night and continually extending infrastructure like light railways and communication cables.⁶ They often found brief reprieve by using the nearby sea or canal facilities for swimming.⁶

Down Time and Culture Shock

For many soldiers, especially those from the Dominions and UK Territorial Forces who had never travelled abroad, Egypt presented an overwhelming cultural shock.

• Boredom and Cairo: Once the initial novelty of being in a foreign country faded, boredom became widespread among the ranks who had been training for months.³ Many troops would travel into Cairo, which was notorious for its bazaars, cafés, and places of vice.¹
• Guidebooks and Friction: The perceived difference in culture and the sense among soldiers that locals were trying to extort them led to tension and sometimes physical confrontation.¹ To manage this, guides like What to Know in Egypt: A Guide for Australian Soldiers were published, which advised against “familiarity with native women,” explained common sicknesses, and even provided Arabic phrases like “go away”.¹

Medical Infrastructure and Casualty Planning

Egypt was crucial not only as a training ground but also as the primary receiving station for casualties from the Gallipoli campaign, requiring extensive medical infrastructure:

• General Hospitals: The large size and location of the staging base meant extensive hospitals were necessary. The palatial Heliopolis Palace Hotel in a Cairo suburb was quickly requisitioned to become the 1st Australian General Hospital (1 AGH), opening for patients on January 24, 1915. Other key facilities included the 2nd Australian General Hospital (2 AGH), established at the Mena House hotel near the Pyramids.⁵
• British and Indian Hospitals: British hospitals were also established, such as the No. 19 British General Hospital at Alexandria, through which thousands of soldiers passed during the Gallipoli campaign. Additional facilities included Indian General Hospitals at Alexandria and the Citadel Bijou Palace, and the conversion of the Egyptian Government Primary School (Nasrieh School) into a 584-bed British Military Hospital.
• Evacuation Chain: The medical planning included more forward units like Casualty Clearing Stations (CCS). The 1st Australian Casualty Clearing Station (1 ACCS) was initially based in Egypt (Port Said in February 1915) before landing at Anzac Cove on the first day of the Gallipoli campaign (April 25, 1915) to provide emergency surgery and treat and evacuate the overwhelming number of wounded. Soldiers deemed unfit during training were also sent to hospitals like the Egyptian Army Hospital at Abassia.³

All stories require some form of research, quite often to place a character in a place at a particular time, especially if it is in a historical context. This series will take you through what it was like in 1914 through 1916.

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Logistical Analysis of Imperial Volunteer Mobilisation: Brisbane to the Force in Egypt, March 1915

I. Strategic Context: Navigating Administrative Jurisdiction in Australia (March 1915)

The mobilisation of a British subject from Queensland, Australia, for direct Imperial Army service in Egypt during March 1915 presents a unique logistical problem defined by the necessity of bypassing the highly organised and centrally administered Australian Imperial Force (AIF). While the Australian Government had pledged substantial forces to Britain and recruitment for the AIF was proceeding robustly across the Dominion ¹, the individual mandate to report for enlistment specifically to an overseas Imperial camp compels a fundamentally different administrative and financial pathway.

A. The Mandate: Imperial Service vs. Dominion Enlistment

In August 1914, recruitment offices for the AIF were swiftly established across Australia, rapidly processing thousands of volunteers willing to support the British Empire.² By early 1915, AIF recruitment was centralised in major cities and towns, often relying on massive urban depots like those in Sydney and Melbourne.³ Volunteers for the AIF benefited significantly from this national mobilisation structure. New AIF recruits received a free railway ticket to the nearest city where basic military training was established, indicating that the Commonwealth absorbed all initial domestic travel costs.² Furthermore, troops were transported overseas on requisitioned vessels designated as HMATs (His Majesty’s Australian Transports).⁴

The user’s explicit requirement to avoid AIF enlistment means forgoing this entire subsidised logistical chain. Since UK conscription was not enacted until January 1916 ⁶, the individual is proceeding as a volunteer, potentially a reservist, reporting directly to the War Office authority overseas. This administrative difference means the entire journey must be treated as a self-funded civilian mobilisation, requiring specific clearance.

B. Administrative Requirement: Securing Imperial Clearance and Financial Liability

The first administrative step, after determining the intention to serve the Imperial forces directly, is securing documentation. Given the AIF’s effective monopoly on local military recruitment ⁷, the individual must locate the nearest representative of the Imperial military authority, likely a British naval attaché or consular office in Brisbane or, more probably, Sydney. This official would need to register the subject’s status and issue necessary travel documentation (such as a warrant or passport endorsement) confirming the destination in Egypt. This documentation is critical for legitimate disembarkation in the highly controlled military zone around the Suez Canal.

The avoidance of the AIF structure carries a substantial financial implication. Where AIF troops were transported free of charge, the independent Imperial subject must acquire commercial passage. An analysis of commercial fares advertised around 1914 and early 1915 confirms this significant expenditure. Saloon (First Class) tickets from Australia to London (which passed through the Suez Canal) were priced around £40, while the economically necessary Third Class (Steerage) fares ranged from £16 16/ to £18 18/.⁸ This outlay, borne entirely by the individual, contrasts sharply with the zero cost for AIF volunteers and represents a fundamental logistical burden imposed by the choice of Imperial service.

II. The Queensland Dilemma: Securing Commercial Maritime Passage

The location of the individual in Brisbane, Queensland, necessitates an initial phase of internal travel to secure a suitable vessel for the long-haul transit to the Suez Canal zone, as Brisbane was not the primary wartime hub for major Imperial sailings.

A. Brisbane’s Role in Wartime Logistics

In March 1915, the overwhelming majority of Australian contingent movements—both the initial First Convoy (November 1914) and the Second Convoy (December 1914)—departed from southern and western ports, specifically Albany, Melbourne, or Sydney.⁹ Brisbane was primarily integrated into the inter-state coastal steamer network.¹⁰ To secure a booking on a commercial passenger liner operating the Imperial route via Suez—vessels belonging to lines such as P. & O. Branch Service, White Star, or Aberdeen Lines ⁸—the individual must transit from Brisbane to a larger, federally important embarkation point, such as Sydney or Melbourne. This domestic travel segment must be self-funded, compounding the initial financial burden.

B. Commercial Shipping Availability and Viable Vessels

Despite the requisitioning of numerous vessels for military service (HMATs), key British passenger lines maintained irregular commercial services to the United Kingdom via the Suez Canal route.⁵ The operational environment in March 1915 was characterised by rapid military requirements leading to the constant conversion of ships, such as the Wandilla, which was converted to a troopship in March 1915.¹²

Crucially, the historical record confirms that individual transports, or ships carrying reinforcements, were sailing to Egypt in this precise timeframe. Documentation shows that a soldier identified as “Arthur” embarked on 13 March 1915, sailing directly to Alexandria, Egypt.¹³ This confirms the existence of vessels cleared for passage that month. The individual, having obtained Imperial clearance, would need to secure a berth on one of these commercial liners or, if permitted by Imperial authorities, a space aboard an official reinforcement transport sailing to the Middle East, which was the established training area before the Gallipoli campaign began the following month.¹⁴ Regardless of the specific vessel, the booking would require adherence to stringent naval control measures implemented for wartime security.

The divergent requirements for the individual, compared to the majority of men enlisting, are summarised below:

Commercial Passage Feasibility (Brisbane to Suez, March 1915)

III. The Voyage: Conditions and Duration (Australia to Port Said)

The maritime journey from the Australian eastern seaboard to the Suez Canal zone constituted the longest and most physically demanding segment of the mobilisation process, typically lasting over one month and exposing the traveller to inherent wartime dangers.

A. Estimated Duration and Route

The voyage length depended heavily on the number of port calls and the speed of the vessel, which, in wartime, was often dictated by naval requirements rather than commercial schedules. Historical accounts from mid-1915 voyages indicate that the transit from a major departure port (such as Sydney/Melbourne) to the Suez Canal area (Suez port) averaged approximately 31 days.¹⁵

Accounting for the necessary internal transit from Brisbane to the southern departure port, the total time commitment from Queensland to disembarkation in Egypt would likely range between five and seven weeks. The established Imperial route proceeded across the Indian Ocean, typically involving a significant refuelling and provisioning stop at Colombo, before proceeding via Aden and into the Red Sea.⁴

B. Wartime Conditions and Naval Security

As an independent paying civilian, the individual’s journey would be defined by the security protocols governing merchant shipping. While the largest Australian troop contingents were often grouped into convoys for naval protection ⁴, many transport vessels in 1915 were dispatched alone, sometimes without naval escort, underlining the inherent risks of trans-oceanic travel in a global conflict.⁵

The physical environment during the final approach to Egypt was notoriously difficult. Upon entering the Red Sea, the heat became “terrific”.¹⁵ This extreme climate, combined with the inevitable crowding and potentially inadequate sanitation common to vessels repurposed for wartime use or carrying large numbers of steerage passengers, represented a significant test of endurance before active service even began.

C. Transit Through the Suez Zone

The journey culminated in transit through the Suez Canal area, a vital strategic waterway fiercely protected by British and Indian forces against Ottoman threats.¹⁷ Disembarkation points for troops included Alexandria, Suez, and Port Said.¹⁹ Troops arriving at the southern end of the Canal (Suez) often anchored for up to two days before disembarking.¹⁵ For the purpose of reaching the camps near Cairo, Port Said (at the northern terminus) or Suez (at the southern terminus) were the most likely points of entry for onward military travel.

IV. Arrival in Egypt: Port Said, Rail Transit, and Entry into the Force in Egypt

Upon arrival in the Suez Canal zone, the British subject transitioned instantly from self-funded civilian traveller to an inducted military asset under the direct control of the British Army’s command structure in Egypt.

A. Disembarkation Protocol and Military Control

Egypt served as a British Protectorate and a massive logistical staging ground for campaigns against the Ottoman Empire.²¹ The arrival port (Port Said or Suez) was a high-security military zone, vital for unloading not only manpower but also animals, guns, and supplies.¹⁹

Immediately upon disembarkation, the individual would fall under the strict military jurisdiction of the local garrison command, which was responsible for managing the massive influx of personnel. Administrative priorities focused heavily on sanitation and discipline. Newly arrived troops were subject to mandatory lectures on personal hygiene and venereal disease (VD) prevention.⁹ Specific areas of port cities and Cairo, known for vice, were designated “out of bounds” by military orders to mitigate health and discipline issues that were rampant among the high number of foreign troops.⁹

The Force in Egypt, commanded by General John Maxwell, was the established formation responsible for garrisoning the armed forces and defending the Suez Canal in 1915.¹⁷ The independent Imperial subject would be channelled directly into this British administrative structure, effectively segregating their processing from the vast, concurrent mobilisation of the ANZAC forces.

B. Rail Transit to the Cairo Camp Complex

The final movement from the port to the capital region relied upon the military-controlled Egyptian railway system, a critical logistical artery running along the Suez Canal.¹⁸ Travel by train from Suez overland to Cairo was documented as taking approximately seven hours.¹⁵

The destination for the independent British subject would be a British-controlled military establishment in the Cairo area, as opposed to the primary Australian hub. While Australian troops were famously concentrated at Mena Camp, a vast training facility near the Giza pyramids approximately 16 kilometres from Cairo ⁹, the British forces utilised other established bases. The Imperial recruit would likely be routed to one of several key British camps or barracks:

1. Zeitoun Camp: A significant British base in the Cairo area.¹⁹
2. Kasr el-Nil barracks: A key British presence located directly in Cairo’s Ismailiya district, near the administrative headquarters in Azbakiyya Square.¹⁹
3. Tel el Kebir: A major training centre located roughly halfway between Port Said and Cairo, used for reinforcement training.¹⁹

The individual would be reporting to the Force in Egypt headquarters, which was centred in Cairo (e.g., the Cosmopolitan Hotel served as the military headquarters).²¹

The summary of the final logistical stage is as follows:

In-Theatre Transit (Port Said/Suez to Cairo, March 1915)

V. Reception and Integration: Induction into the Imperial Force in Egypt (1915)

The final administrative step involved the induction process into the existing British military establishment in Egypt, which, in 1915, was primarily focused on canal defence and preparing troops for potential deployment elsewhere.

A. Induction Process and Logistical Shortages

Upon arrival at the assigned British camp near Cairo, the recruit would undergo formal administrative processing under the authority of the Force in Egypt.¹⁷ Given the immense volunteer rush experienced globally by the British Army in the initial phase of the war, the processing system was often strained and characterised by haste.²²

The initial medical examination was designed to quickly vet the volunteer’s fitness for service.²² Historical evidence suggests that early in the war, the pressure to acquire manpower often led recruiting sergeants and medical officers to relax physical standards, resulting in men with existing medical conditions being accepted.²³ The individual should expect a rapid, possibly perfunctory, medical inspection before formal attestation.

Following acceptance, the new soldier would be issued equipment and a uniform.²⁴ However, the logistical infrastructure in 1914–1915 struggled to keep pace with the huge volume of incoming volunteers. As a result, conditions in training camps were often basic, and supplies of necessary equipment were limited.²² The issued uniform might be ill-fitting or incomplete, a common complaint among new recruits during this period.²⁴

B. Training Environment and Camp Life

The newly inducted soldier would be assigned to a unit or a general reinforcement depot, likely at Zeitoun or possibly Tel el Kebir, joining the stream of Territorial Force or New Army reinforcements funnelling through Egypt.¹⁹

Training was immediate and intensive, typically involving six days of activity per week.⁹ While the physical environment was novel, camp life was highly disciplined. The proximity of the military camps to Cairo meant that the new troops were introduced immediately to an exotic, yet volatile, urban environment. Soldiers were allowed to explore Cairo city, renowned for its bazaars, cafés, and vice districts.⁹ This interaction frequently led to tension and physical confrontations with local residents, who were sometimes viewed with mistrust by the soldiers, particularly the well-paid Dominion troops.⁹ The infamous “Battles of the Wazzer” (May/June 1915) were violent clashes involving troops and local business owners in Cairo’s entertainment district, a direct consequence of the strain placed on the city by the large military presence.²¹

To combat disciplinary problems and prevent the spread of disease, the military established strict controls, including declaring certain city areas off-limits and even setting up medically controlled brothels overseen by the Medical Corps.⁹ The new recruit, therefore, entered a training environment defined not only by drill and fitness but also by strict adherence to military regulations aimed at minimising cultural friction and preserving public health within the crucial Egyptian staging ground.

Conclusions

The administrative requirement for a British subject in Queensland to report directly for Imperial enlistment in Egypt in March 1915 critically defined their logistical experience. By avoiding the AIF’s streamlined and subsidised mobilisation, the individual assumed full financial responsibility for travel, requiring an outlay of between £16 and £40 for commercial passage via the Suez Canal route.⁸

The journey required a mandatory, self-funded internal transit from Brisbane to a major southern port (Sydney or Melbourne) to secure passage on an irregular commercial liner or reinforcement transport sailing to the Middle East. The long voyage, lasting approximately 31 days across the Indian Ocean and through the intensely hot Red Sea, culminated in disembarkation at a military port like Suez or Port Said.

The final leg of the journey involved transfer by military railway (approximately seven hours) to a British training establishment in the Cairo area, such as Zeitoun Camp or Kasr el-Nil barracks, distinct from the large Australian training area at Mena. Induction would be swift, marked by potentially rushed medical inspection and the issuance of basic, possibly incomplete, kit. The soldier was immediately integrated into the volatile military ecosystem of the Force in Egypt, characterised by intense training, stringent discipline, and high cultural tension with the local population.